The present activity increase in the basins when the deionization systems are inactive is approximately 0.31 dprn/ml/day for L-Basin [1] and 36 dpm/ml/day for RBOF [2] . The current source term for CS-137 in the L-Basin includes releases from the inventory of "at risk" Mk-16 assemblies together with releases from the basin walls, sludge, and fuel 1The total cesium content of the BRFA is equal to that of the Reference Fuel Assembly (WA) used in the authorization basis for the Receiving Basin for Offsite FueIs (RBOF) Page2 ofll WSRC-TR-97-0153 May 1997 surface contamination. The RBOF source term includes releases from the inventory of failed Taiwanese Research Reactor fuel, Heavy Water Components Test Reactor fuel and several other degraded fuels. These rates would increase with the storage of 1500 BRFAs to totals of 5.53 and 71.2 dpm/ml/day, respectively for L-Basin and RBOF. In the event of inactive deionizer operation when storing 1500 BIWAS, the authorized CS-137 activity level of 2000 dpmhnl for L-basin [3] and total activity of 220,000 dpmhnl for RBOF [4] , would not be exceeded for 350 days and 8.5 years, respectively. This provides sufficient time to implement portable deionizer systems that have successfully been used in the past, if such implementation was necessary.
The acceptance criteria for the physical condition of Al SNF for direct storage in SRS basins [5] is derived from present requirements for receipt of foreign research reactor (FRR) fuel [6] and excludes fuels with cladding breaches without canning. This present evaluation predicts the effect of direct storage, without canning, of Al SNF with minor cladding penetrations on basin activity. These results demonstrate that operations would remain well within the authorization basis.
INTRODUCTION
Approximately 20 metric tons or approximately 15,000 aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel (Al SNF) assemblies will be shipped from foreign research reactors (FRR) to the Savannah River Site (SRS) over the next 10-15 years. These assemblies will be stored at SRS in the L-Basin and the RBOF. A number of these fbel assemblies have corrosion or mechanical damage that has resulted in minor penetrations (breaches) of the aluminum cladding and exposure of the fuel core to the basin water. Corrosion of this exposed core will cause release of radionuclides to the basin water. This report provides an evaluation of the release rates of radionuclides from breached Al SNF assemblies and evaluates the effect of direct storage of breached fuel at a conservative upper bound reference condition on the basin water activity level and waste generation.
DISCUSSION

Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel
Aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel (Al SNF) is made by powder metallurgy or by casting and rolling. The fiel core for most of these fuels is an aluminum matrix in which particles (dispersoids) of either UAIX, U$3iz, or U308 oxide particles are embedded. The core is protected by a cladding of aluminum alloy which is metallurgically bonded to the core.
The general structure of the fuel core material, dispersoids in aluminum (Figure 1 ), is retained following irradiation [7] . Small, uniformly-distributed pockets of fission product gases form within the fuel during irradiation for the UAIXand U308 dispersoid fuels; the largest pockets of gas are formed in the high-burnup U3Si2 dispersoid fuel ( Figure 2 ). The gas pockets are not interconnected. Otherwise, no significant redistribution of the fission products occurs. That is, the fission products are uniformly distributed throughout the fuel core, the fiel/cladding bond is retained, and if the cladding becomes penetrated, only the immediate fuel core area at the point of breach is exposed.
The mechanism for the potential release of radioactive species is quite different for the Al SNF fuel than for commercial reactor spent fuels. In the case of commercial reactor spent fuel rods, a pin-hole breach in the zircalloy cladding essentially provides a direct path for WSRC-TR-97-0153 May 1997
Page 3 of 11 release of fission products from the fuel core region to the surroundings. This is not the case in Al SNF because the fission products are contained locally in the fkel core region.
Breaches in the claddings of Al SNF typically occur through pitting corrosion or mechanical damage. Pitting corrosion is prevalent only under aggressive water chemistry conditions [8] [9] [10] . Appendix 1 provides an additional discussion on the corrosion of Al SNF in basin storage.
Although there are multiple types of aluminum-based fhel, all have the common structure of dispersoids in aluminum and are expected to have similar corrosion behavior and release behavior in high purity water at basin temperatures. The corrosion rate of the exposed fuel decreases slowly with time as a passive film grows on the fuel material. A cladding breach results in a very slow release rate of radioactivity under the low conductivity, high purity storage conditions of the SRS basins. 
Model for Radioactivity Release Rate from Al SNF
A model for the radioactivity release rate of fuel with cladding breaches is needed for estimating the release rates from Al SNF representative of the expected receipts. In general, the release rate of radioactivity from Al SNF for a given level of cladding breach is dependent on several factors: At the low temperatures typical of basin storage, corrosion is the primary mechanism whereby species from the fhel core are released into the water. The radionuclides are conservatively assumed to be not bound in the corrosion product, but rather are fully soluble and free to disperse into the water. No significant galvanic interaction between an aluminum-uranium fuel material and aluminum cladding has been measured [10] . Therefore, a simple model to estimate the release from fuel core is developed by considering general corrosion of the fuel core region directly exposed to the environment. The release model is given by:
R= AxBx C where R [Ci/hr] is the total radioactivity release rate; A [Ci/ins] is the total radioactivity in the fuel core material at the decay time of interest B [inz] is the area of fuel exposed to the environment (area of breach); and C [inlhr] is the general corrosion rate of the fuel core material in the environment of exposure (i.e. the corrosion rate is a function of temperature and water quality).
This model can be applied to water storage at temperatures where general corrosion of the exposed fuel is the primary release mechanism (< 200"C). Above this temperature, i) hydrogen blistering attack and exfoliation of the fuel material could occur greatly increasing the rate of attack of the fiel material; and ii) diffusion of radioactive species in the fuel material could occur to allow communication of the bulk fiel core with the exposed surface in direct contact with the water.
Results from laboratory corrosion tests at the Savannah River Technology Center show that both 1O%U-AI and 8001 aluminum cladding with fresh surface finishes (600 grit) have a corrosion rate of 0.17 nils per year (2 x 10-8 inlhr) in basin water at room temperature. The fresh surface corrosion rate is expected to be similar for all aluminum-based fuel core materials and can be used as an upper bound estimate of the corrosion rate in basin water. The corrosion rate should decrease slowly with time as a passive film grows on the fuel material in a manner similar to the corrosion of aluminum in water at temperatures less than 100"C [1 1]. For the purpose of this study, a corrosion rate of 0.2 mpy is used to bound the corrosion rate of exposed Al SNF fuel core material in basin water.
Measurements of Release of Radioactivity from Al SNF
Radioactivity releases from spent fuel can be measured directly by performing a "sip" test. The test is performed by measuring the activity of CS-137 in a specified volume of water before and after the fuel "rests" in the water for a specified period. A special field experiment using this testing method to measure the cesium release rates from individual fuel assemblies was performed with Materials Test Reactor (IWI'R) assemblies in Brad [12] . This experiment involved using fuels with and without through-clad pits, as well as, fuels before and after removal of some of the surface corrosion nodules. A summary of the field examinations is contained in Appendix 2 of this report. Assembly IEA-53, having the greatest extent of pitting corrosion over the fuel meat (see Appendix 2), released 9.24 nCi/hr at a constant rate [5, 12] .
A validation of the release model discussed above is performed by the following calculation using the data from assembly IEA-53. The fiel plates of IEA-53 contained 45~o uranium in aluminum, 2070 enriched in U-235. The plates had a moderate burn-up of 16.7% prior to remowd from the reactor in 1962. The present CS-137 activity of the plates is 1.92 Ci/plate [13] . This corresponds to a fuel core activity of 1.36 Ci/ins. Using an estimate of exposed fuel area of 10 pits of 1/4 inch (0.635 cm) diameter exposes 0.5 inz (3.2 cmz) of fuel core material and abounding corrosion rate of 0.2 nils per year, the predicted release rate is 15.5 nCi/hr. This result is in conservative agreement to the measured release rate of 9.24 nCi/h.r.
The release of radionuclides is due to aqueous corrosion. Removal of breached Al SNF from water and exposure to air will stop this corrosion, and mitigate the release of radionuclides. Measurements of radioactivity release for fuels heated in air are being performed under a separate Savannah River Technology Center program conducted at Argome National Laboratory. The results of recent tests to measure the species released from exposed fuel heated at 275°C in air have shown no detectable release of any radionuclides from U2Si3-Al fuel in a one-month test [14] . The microstructure of the fuel specimen used in this testis shown in Figure 2 . 
Impact of Storage of Breached Al SNF on the Authorization Basis for the Operation of the SRS Basins
Consequences of Release of Activitv from the SRS Basins
The authorization basis for L-Basin and for RBOF~e set forth in their respective Basis for Interim Operation [3, 4] . The safety envelope is established by analyzing the risks associated with various accident scenarios and is based on specific assumptions regarding basin operations, including basin water radionuclide content. The authorization basis for L Basin [3] limits the basin water cesium concentration to 2000 dprn/rnl. Under a worst case accident scenario during which the entire 3.5 million gallons of water at 2000 dpm/ml is instantaneously evaporated and released to the environment, the consequence to the public is a total dose of 16 roll. The on-site worker is exposed to dose rate of 14 mR/hr, within DOE radiological working limits.
The RBOF authorization basis assumes a total basin water activity concentration of 220;000 dpm/ml (0.1 pCi). The concentration values are higher than the L-Basin values because of the smaller volume of basin water, 500,000 gallons, and past operating history. The maximum activity of the basin water in RBOF has been 220,000 dpm/rnl in one of the isolated basins during fuel handling and cutting operations [4] . A total release of the R.BOF water inventory is negligible because it is bounded by an accident analysis of the estimated exposure from a hypothetical tank farm release. The tank farm release assumes a radionuclide inventoxy release signit3cantly higher than the RBOF water inventory and consequences of worst case scenario for RBOF, similar to L-Basin, is negligible. Therefore, dose estimate impacts to the public and on-site workers from the operation of RBOF were not estimated in its authorization basis.z
The basin facilities are managed and operated to much lower limits of radionuclide concentrations through deionization to further improve the safety of facility, maximize ALARA, and minimiz e waste generation. Although process requirements limit the L Area cesium activity limit to 1000 dpm/ml, the current steady-state cesium activity level is less than 4 dpm/ml [1] . The current steady-state RBOF activity level is 259 dpm/rnl [2] compared with 15,500 dpm/rnl total activity, the TPAhnical Safety Requirement for the facility.
Other radionuclides potentially released from breached fiels include gaseous fission products and noble gases. The risks associated with the release of these radionuclides are bounded by the accident scenario involving an inadvertent criticality in the basins. The postulated criticality releases significantly more gaseous fission products than that released from a breach in the fuel cladding. The doses to the public associated with an inadvertent criticality are insi@lcant relative to other risks associated with the the L-Basin and relative to other RBOF risks.
The activity release into the basin water is based on the potential releases associated with darnaging a reference fuel assembly (WA) [3] . The release of gaseous fission products and noble gases are not contained in the basin water. In accordance with Safety Guide 1.25 [15] , damage of fuel results in the release of 30% of the KI-85 and 10% of other 2A Safety Analysis Report (WSRC-SA-11) for RBOF is undergoing final approval. The results in this present report are consistent with the SAR.
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Page 7 of 11 May 1997 and noble gases are not contained in the basin water. In accordance with Safety Guide 1.25 [15] , damage of fuel results in the release of 30% of the IQ-85 and 10% of other noble gases and iodine. A bounding analysis conservatively assumes that 2200 RFA's are damaged concurrently, each containing 1050 curies of Kr-85. No other noble gases are present in the isotopic iiiventory (see Table 6 -1 of reference 3 of this report) as a result of the two year cooling period. A comparison of the total radiological release to the minimum radiological source terms required to meet consequence level thresholds (Tables 6-10 and 6-11 of reference 3) results in a determination of low consequences to the facility worker (<25 rem), the onsite worker (< 500 rnrem), and the maximum exposed offsite individual (public, <100 mrem).
Another important factor in the operations of the basins is the consequence of the cesium loading of the ion exchange resin beds of the deionizer system. The L Area deionizer system design basis was an 8 curie loading of the zeolite beds used for cesium removal. Shielding was designed to maintain the worker dose less than 1 mR/hr. Currently, the zeolite beds only retain 2 curies of cesium before replacement is required because of accumulation of other dissolved solids in the mixed beds. The postulated addition of 1500 breached clad assemblies would increase the zeolite loading from 2 curies to slightly less than 8 curies, before change out, still within the design basis of the system, safety authorization, and with no increase in waste volume. Similarly, the RBOF resin beds are regenerated twice per year, and no change to the schedule or additional waste volume would result due to the storage of 1500 BRFAs. Only the curie loading would increase. Shielded cells and remote resin handling equipment preclude additional worker dose.
Im~act of Postulated Release Rates on Water Activitv Relative to the Authorization Basis
As stated, the Basis for Interim Operation of the SRS basins assumes a limit of 2000 dpmhnl for CS-137 for L-Basin and 220,000 dpmhnl total activity for RBOF [3, 4] . The steady-state activity level during basin operation is dependent on the deionization capacity and the releases into the basin horn sludge, basin walls, contamination on spent fuel, and exposed fuel material. With the new deionization system in L-Basin, the current water activity level is less than 4 dpmhnl [1] . The current water activity level in RBOF is 259 dprnhnl [2].
A calculation is performed for the postulated storage scenario of 1500 Al SNF assemblies with breached fuel cladding to evaluate the increase in activity level of the water. A breached reference fuel assembly (BRFA) is developed from the Reference Fuel Assembly (RFA) used in the safety basis for the SRS basins [3] and which bounds the worst case breach observed in the field inspections performed through the Foreign Research Reactor Fuel receipts. The CS-137 loading of the RFA is 9280 Ci [3] . The RFA is actually for a storage location rather than an individual assembly and six assemblies are typically stored per location. The research reactor fiels are primarily the Materials Test Reactor design. These fuels have 18 fuel plates each with a nominal fuel core volume of 23.5" x 2.5" x 0.02". The volumenc CS-137 loading of the BRFA is simply calculated to be 9280 Ci per storage location/(6 assemblies per storage location x 18 fuel plates per MTR assembly x 23.5" x 2.5" x 0.02" per plate) or 73.1 Ci/inq.
A value of 0.5 inz of exposed fuel core is equivalent to ten WI" diameter through-clad pits, equivalent to the worst pitted assembly observed during the field inspections to date. Using 1500 BRFAs with 0.5 inz of exposed fuel is bounding and takes into account the Thus, the BRFA is defined as a reference fiel assembly with a:
" CS-137 loading of 73.1 Ci/ins of fuel material; and an q Exposed fuel core region of 0.5 in2.
Using the release rate model described above, the release rate from the RBFA in basin water is 0.00731 Ci/year, or 0.835 pCilhr.
Under steady-state conditions, the deionizer system will remove soluble radioactivity (e.g. CS-137) and suspended insoluble radioactive particles at a rate equal to the total release rate into the basin. The removal rate is a function of the system flow rate and the radioactivity concentration of the water. This steady state condition is expressed as follows:
where: Q = flow rate through the system (gal/day) C = steady-state activity of the water (dpmhnl) A= activity release rate to the water (dpm/rnl/day) V = basin volume (gal)
The deionizer systems at SRS are designed for continuous operation. The average flow rate, Q, for the L-Basin deionizer is assumed to be 200 gpm. The volume of L-Basin is 3,375,000 gallons. For a postulated scenmio of 1500 BRFAs, each releasing CS-137 at 0.835 pCi/hr into the basin, A is calculated to be 5.22 dprn/ml/day. The steady-state concentration C is calculated to be 61.1 dprnhnl. This is the estimated increase to the present steady-state concentration of approximately 4 dpmhnl. Recent trending data collected with the L-Basin deionizer system inactive shows the activity increase rate to be approximately 0.31 dpndtiday [1] resulting from the inventory of "at-risk" Mk-16 fuel, basin sludge, and basin wall contamination. The graph in figure 3 shows that the L-basin deionizer system could be inactive for 350 days before the authorized limit would be exceeded. In comparison, the same calculation performed for 1500 assemblies releasing CS-137 at 9.24 nCi/hr, the release rate measured for assembly IEA-53, results in a release rate of 0.0578 dpm/ml/day and a steady-state concentration, C, of 0.475 dpmhnl; the deionizer system could be inactive for 14.9 years before the authorized limit would be exceeded.
For RBOF, the flow rate through the deionizer, Q, is approximately 100 gpm and the basin volume is 500,000 gallons. For the same postulated scenario of 1500 BRFAs each releasing CS-137 at 0.835 pCi/hr into the basin, A is calculated to be 35.2 dprn/rnI/day. The steady-state concentration C is calculated to be 123 dpmhnl; this is the estimated increase to the present steady-state concentration of 259 dpmhnl [2] . Recent trending data collected with the RBOF deionizer system inactive shows the activity increase rate to be approximately 36 dpm/ml/day [2] . The graph in figure 4 shows that the RBOF system could be inactive for 8.5 years before the authorized limit would be exceeded. This CONCLUSIONS A release rate model was developed for aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel (Al SNF) with breached cladding. The measured release rates from fhels in basin storage are consistent with the model. The anticipated release for a conservative bounding scenario of 1500 breached reference fuel assemblies (BRFAs) stored in SRS basins was determined. The application of the model showed that the storage of each BRFA will result in a release rate of 0.835 pCi/hrofCs-137. With active deionization, the basin water activity levels are estimated to be 65.1 dprn/rnl and 382 dpmhnl, well below the authorization basis limits of 2000 dprn/rnl and 220,000 dprnhnl for L-Basin and RBOF, respectively. In the event the deionization systems are inactive, the authorized limits would not be exceeded for 350 days and 8.5 years for L Basin and RBOF, respectively. Fully demonstrated portable deionizes could be brought online within these time periods, if necessaxy. Although storage of the breached fhels would cause an increase in the curie loading of the waste streams, there would be no increase in the volume of waste generated. The increased curie loading is within the design bases of the facilities and allowed under the authorization bases.
APPENDIX 1-Corrosion of Aluminum-Clad SNF in Wet Basin Storage
Corrosion of aluminum alloys and production fuels at SRS and other water storage facilities has been documented [1] [2] [3] . Corrosion of the aluminum-clad and the urauiumaluminum alloy fuel core in water storage basins can be attributed to poor quality water at some point in the fuel storage lifetime. Corrosion surveillance tests at SRS have shown that storage in poor quality water can result in pitting corrosion of aluminum alloys. Pit depths of 30 nils, equivalent to the cladding thickness of SRS fuel, were measured on coupons exposed to aggressive basin conditions for 2 months in water with a conductivity of approximately 200 pS/cm. Under aggressive water condhion, the corrosion product on the aluminum cladding is characterized, generally, by crusted nodules of aluminum oxide located primarily in scratches in the protective oxide coating formed during fuel irradiation [4] . These thinned areas make it easier for aggressive ions like chlorides to attack the aluminum. As aluminum oxide is formed, an occluded cell with an aggressive, acidic environment can develop beneath the nodule. This can result in a rapid pit formation in the alloy, penetrating the cladding thickness in short time periods. Visible signs of crusted oxide nodules on aluminum indicate that pitting corrosion has taken place and there is attack beneath these nodules and a high probability of penetration of the cladding.
Pitting corrosion is dMicult to predict from water composition alone because of the synergistic nature of the aggressive impurities and the variables involved [1] [2] [3] ; however, recent laboratory data have shown that water solutions with conductivities less than 50 pS/cm are non-aggressive to cause pitting corrosion and that the chloride ion maybe the controlling factor for pit initiation under basin conditions [5] . The major environmental factors believed to influence the pitting of aluminum alloys are [1] [2] [3] : conductivity, pH, bicarbonate, chloride, sulfate, and oxygen content of the water. In addition, the corrosion process is enhanced by the aluminumkeel dissimilar metal couples which exist throughout most basins. Heavy metals like copper and mercury and noble metals like silver can plate out on the aluminum forming strong localized anodic/cathodic sites which promote aggressive pitting of the aluminum.
In contrast, pitting corrosion has not been seen on aluminum cladding and corrosion surveillance coupons stored in high quality water. The water in RBOF has been maintained with a conductivity in the 1-3 pS/cm range and aggressive impurity concentrations in the parts-per-billion range. After an extensive campaign over the last several years to cleanup the reactor basins which has included sludge removal, new continuous deionization equipment installation, and new aluminum storage racks, all basins at SRS are being maintained below 4 pS/cm. No new pitting corrosion has been seen in the reactor basins since 1993.
Field tests have shown that pitting corrosion is mitigated when the pitted materials are exposed to high quality water. Fuels that contained through-clad pits with surface corrosion nodules were measured to determine radionuclide release before and after removal of the nodules using a sip test with high purity, low conductivity water [6] . The release rates of CS-137 from the pitted fuel before and after the removal of the nodules were identicaI which indicates that an aggressive water chemistry does not exist under the nodules when placed in high quality basin water.
APPENDIX 2-Examination of Brazilian Research Reactor MTR Fuel
A team of scientist and engineers from SRS visited the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research of the Nuclear Energy Commission at Sao Paulo (IPEN/CNEN-SP), Brazil July 22-31, 1996 [1] to characterize the extent of corrosion and the effect of this corrosion on the release of radionuclides from this fhel to the research reactor basin water.
Using an underwater v~deo camera system, along with an 8mIn video camcorder above the ' surface of the basin, detailed inspections were made on 66 SNF assemblies which had been stored in the basin water environment for 25-35 years. Nodules of white corrosion products on the outside fuel plates of 41 assemblies were visible to the eye from above the water surface. Hard crusted mounds of aluminum oxide ranged in sizes from about 1/32 inch to 1/4-1/2 inch in diameter as estimated by comparison with drilled holes in the edges of the side plates known to be 0.096 inches in diameter. These oxide nodules are shown on an external fuel plate from IPEN fuel assembly No. 53 below in Figure 1 .
Figure 1-Assembly IEA-53 Before Removal of Nodules
This assembly was selected for an in-depth examination because it showed among the highest leach rates of CS-137 as determined by a sip test. In addition, this assembly had the largest deposits of visible corrosion product over the fuel plates. This corrosion was typical of the corrosion seen on most of the 41 assemblies. Without exception, every large nodule of oxide of was associated with a thru-clad pit in the aluminum cladding beneath the corrosion product. This was determined by brushing or scraping the oxide nodule to remove from the fuel plate to reveal the pit below. Figure 2 shows typical through-clad pits after oxide removal from some of the nodules on the fuel plate of assembly IEA-53. The pits were judged to be through the 0.015 mil cladding by comparison with the known 0.096 mil diameter holes drilled in the side plates. Analysis of the nodular corrosion product using gamma ray spectroscopy showed uranium-235, europium-154, and cesium-137, confirming that the pit associated with the nodule had breached the cladding into the fuel core. At the time of this underwater fuel inspection, this visual examination was the most extensive examination of Al SNF in water storage basin in the world. It showed that based on the size of the visible corrosion nodule as compared to known reference dimensions on the fuel, a judgment can be made on the size of the pit beneath this product. As the cladding thickness on the research reactor fuel is relatively thin compared to the diameter of the oxide nodules, the pits generated in the surface of the fuel plates have a high probability of penetrating the clad into the U-Al core.
The details of the sip tests of the Brazil fuels are contained in reference 1.
